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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3241
___________
YAN QING CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A99-432-582)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 14, 2009
Before:   FUENTES, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: October 22, 2009   
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Yan Qing Chen petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) final order of
removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny his petition for review.
       Before the IJ, Chen indicated that he did not wish to pursue his claim for relief under1
the CAT.  (A.R. 1151.)  Additionally, the BIA found that he waived any such claim by
not raising it on appeal.  Accordingly, we will not address the merits of that claim.
2
Chen, a native and citizen of China, was charged with removability
pursuant to INA § 237(a)(1)(A).  It is not clear from the record when or where he entered
the United States, but he did so without proper documentation.  Thereafter, he applied for
asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) in October 2005.   He alleged that he feared returning to China because he and1
his wife had two U.S.-born children in violation of China’s family planning policies. 
Following a hearing, the IJ denied relief, determining that Chen failed to meet his burden
of proof.  He appealed to the BIA, asking that the record be remanded to the IJ for the
consideration of additional evidence.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief and
denied Chen’s motion to remand.  Chen timely filed a petition for review.
We have jurisdiction over this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
To qualify for asylum, Chen must show that he is a “refugee”; in other words, that he is
“unable or unwilling to return to [China] . . . because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158.  “[A]
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization,
or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been
3persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well-founded fear that
he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  The well-founded fear of
persecution standard involves both a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an
objectively reasonable possibility of persecution.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 430-31 (1987).  To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant
must demonstrate “a clear probability of persecution.”  See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1238 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Because the BIA independently assessed the record, we review only the
BIA’s final order of removal.  See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir.
2003).  The BIA concluded, based on the evidence in the record, that Chen had not met
his burden of demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution.  This finding is subject to
review under the substantial evidence standard.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477,
483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  Under this deferential standard of review, we will uphold the
findings of the BIA “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion but
compels it.”  Id. at 484.  We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion.  Liu v. Attorney Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under this standard,
we will reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  
4The BIA determined that Chen failed to carry his burden of proof.  Chen’s
testimony consisted of the fact that he has two U.S.-born children and that, before he
came to the United States, he saw “thousands” of posters and heard “thousands” of
broadcasts indicating that if a couple’s first child is a boy, they cannot have any additional
children, and if their first child is a girl, they must wait four years before applying for a
permit to allow them to have a second child.  (A.R. 1168-69.)  Once they have had a
second child, either the husband or the wife must be sterilized.  (A.R. 1169.)  He further
testified that he was not personally aware of anyone who returned to China from the
United States with two foreign-born children and was forced to undergo sterilization. 
(A.R. 1171.)  The BIA assumed that Chen’s testimony was credible and noted the
extensive documentation he submitted in support of his claim, but concluded that it was
insufficient to demonstrate an objectively reasonable likelihood of sterilization upon his
return to China.  We cannot say that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.  See Yu
v. Attorney Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming BIA determination that,
without additional evidence to the contrary, recent State Department Country Reports
indicate that petitioner’s fear of forcible sterilization was not reasonable); Chen v.
Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring asylum applicant to demonstrate by
“credible, direct, and specific evidence an objectively reasonable basis for the claimed
fear of persecution”).   
       We note in particular that Chen maintains that “[w]hen taken with the record2
evidence, Dr. Aird’s expert opinion makes a convincing argument that the Petitioner’s
fear that he will be forcibly sterilized is reasonable. . . . Absent any rebuttal expert
affidavit, the BIA had no reason not to accept and give full weight to Dr. Aird’s opinion
as conclusive proof that the PRC’s family planning policy remains coercive and would be
applied to the Petitioner.”  (Pet’r Br. 31.)  However, in Yu v. Attorney General, 513 F.3d
346 (3d Cir. 2008), we agreed with the BIA that recent State Department reports tend to
cast doubt on the utility of Dr. Aird’s frequently-cited affidavit, which provided only
generalized statements regarding China’s family planning policies and did not specifically
address the issue of couples returning to China with children born overseas.  Id. at 348-
49.
5
On appeal, Chen argues that BIA’s decision must be vacated as it failed to
explicitly consider each document he submitted in support of his claim.  We disagree.  As
we have previously held, the BIA “is not required to ‘write an exegesis on every
contention.  What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its
decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and
thought and not merely reacted.’” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted)).  The BIA’s opinion clearly acknowledged the voluminous record compiled by
Chen and concluded that it was insufficient to carry his burden of proof.  Chen has not
demonstrated that a contrary conclusion is compelled.2
Next, Chen challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand.  While the
BIA has noted that motions to remand are not explicitly provided for by the statutory
scheme, when such a motion requests relief normally provided for by a motion to reopen
or to reconsider, the BIA will treat is as such.  See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464,
6471 (BIA 1992).  Chen’s motion consisted of one paragraph requesting that the case be
remanded to the IJ to allow him to consider and make part of the record over 1,000 pages
of background documentation.  (A.R. 21.)  Chen made no argument regarding what that
evidence would show, or why it was previously unavailable.  (Id.)  As the BIA noted, the
vast majority of the documents attached to his motion pre-dated the IJ’s January 10, 2007
decision.  As Chen failed to demonstrate that these documents were material and
previously unavailable, the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (explaining that evidence in support of a motion to reopen
must be material and previously unavailable); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988)
(charging the BIA with determining whether the applicant has offered previously
unavailable material evidence and demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief sought).  
We have considered all of Chen’s arguments and conclude that they are
without merit.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
